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Safety and Security are highly related. Both the safe and secure states would be perfect if no risk 
would loom. However, this situation will be utopian. With respect to safety we know life is full of 
risks which may be large, yet acceptable if we enjoy the activity or the situation, but when 
subjected to it involuntarily we want risk to be negligible. With regard to security the objective is 
identical: we want the risk of security breach to be negligible. Risk assessment has the objective to 
try to determine the magnitude of risks to judge their acceptability. Now, a safety risk has two 
components: the consequence of an accidental event and the probability of the event occurring. 
The former depends on the intensity of the exposure (in terms of power, impulse, shock pressure, 
heat, toxic concentration, radiation), the duration of exposure and the vulnerability of exposed 
people, of exposed responsive structures or that of the environment, together determining the 
damage or loss. The latter, the probability, depends on many factors of technical, organizational or 
human nature. In safety, we also make the distinction between personal safety of the worker in the 
plant environment, who may be directly in contact with hazardous material but can make use of 
personal protective equipment, and process safety which considers upsets and mishaps of the 
process occurring often suddenly and involving spread of hazardous material over relatively large 
areas and threatening the public. In security, this distinction is obviously not relevant from the 
point of view of the perpetrator. 
As mentioned, the concept of security is much related to that of safety, and certainly to process 
safety. This is clearly true regarding the intensity of a damaging agent and the vulnerability of the 
exposed people and objects, yet security differs fundamentally of the concept of safety. This is in 
the sense that where in safety nobody wants the damage to occur, in case of security there is a 
malevolent individual, group or people that wants the damage done. As the objective of plant 
owner and society, and thus of government is to keep also in this case the risk low, the aim to 
cause intentional damage and preferably to cause the loss in a single event as large as possible, 
places the field of security is a fully different perspective.  
Both good safety level and good security level require predictive assessment of possible 
damage consequences given a scenario of the release of energy or hazardous substance in a certain 
situation and the possible occurrence of domino effects. The obvious reason for identifying 
scenarios and predicting potential damage is that it enables installing preventive measures and 
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protective structures that would reduce damage in the unfortunate case a scenario would unfold. 
So, there are parallels again, since the properties of substances, the physical spreading mechanisms 
upon release from containment and the action on exposed people and objects, will be the same. 
One subtle difference is, though, that the latter will be indicated by a perpetrator as ‘targets’. A 
further difference and rather elementary one is the way a release is initiated. In safety risk, it is a 
release by an unforeseen failure of equipment due to wear or a design flaw, or wrong use, 
negligence and operating error. In a deliberate attack on a well-functioning process plant, storage 
facility or transportation system, initiation mechanism will be totally different. The mechanism 
will depend too on the intention behind the attack. Will it be to destroy as much as possible in 
order to deny the use of the product or to threaten people around and cause fatalities, or is it to 
steal material for selling it or to cause damage in terroristic attack elsewhere?  
So, even where parallelism in both safety and security is largest, in elaboration differences are 
quite large and what is important is that the way hazardous material can be released, determines 
also the way barriers shall be designed. In intentional attack one can go for brute force by use of 
high explosives brought inside the plant, dropped into it from a distance by, e.g., a drone, or a 
person with a device propelling a projectile from outside the fence. In contrast, one can also 
intrude into a plant area, e.g., being disguised as a plant worker, and purposely sabotage the 
process or means of storage and transportation. Possibilities will affect decisions about optimal 
nature of the barriers, their structure, and placement.  
A special initiating agent that only marginally gets consideration in safety but is very important 
in security, is the cyber threat. Quite a few types of barriers are control loops that consist of a 
sensor, processor and actuator. Hacking a plant’s control systems can be a threat exerted from a 
remote spot. Hacking may disturb or even destroy the control and halt the process. Although in 
general there will be some protection regarding lightning, also generating directed powerful 
electro-magnetic pulse will be a potential threat that can be brought to bear at some distance. 
Anyhow, estimating the likelihood of an occurrence in safety and security will be totally 
different. In safety, over the years very slow progress has been made to at least estimating the 
range of event rates to be expected. Where in the past risk assessments on a ‘frozen’ static 
situation were already notoriously inaccurate with respect to probability, step by step the dynamic 
operational risk by human activity is being considered as well. In security, no estimate is possible. 
This is because historical data fortunately are very few, so no statistics can be derived. Of course, 
one can make a guess on the basis of what an attacker would think is attractive which plant 
equipment would be a preferable target. This whole matter is very relevant when, with a limited 
budget decisions have to be made on how to protect best. So, hazard identification and very 
thorough definition of possible scenarios which depend on process, plant and environment will be 
of utmost importance. Failing to see a possibility can be fatal, but completeness is almost 
impossible and reliance must also be sought in sufficient degrees of resilience, which is another 
chapter. On the other hand, as in war games and operational research, game theory can be applied 
to weigh chances of an attacker against those of a defender given the scenarios defined and the 
layers of protection realized. Optimization will be a good research aim. 
Altogether, it will be clear that given the complexity of possible scenarios, to protect the 
general public and involved plant personnel against possible effects of hazardous materials, being 
released accidentally or intentionally, and to save costly process equipment from these effects, it is 
Hans Pasman / Journal of Integrated Security Science 2017 (1) 29-31    31 
 
worth to spend a strong research effort on a wide variety of aspects. We hope to welcome in this 
journal many contributions of researches on various topics that will build and expand relevant 
knowledge to the benefit of all. 
